Family Law: Parent and Child by Paulsen, James W.
SMU Law Review
Volume 49
Issue 4 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 16
1996
Family Law: Parent and Child
James W. Paulsen
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
James W. Paulsen, Family Law: Parent and Child, 49 SMU L. Rev. 1063 (1996)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol49/iss4/16
FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
James W. Paulsen*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. STA TU S .................................................. 1065
II. CONSERVATORSHIP ................................... 1070
III. SU PPO RT ................................................ 1078
IV. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION ..................... 1084
NY review of recent developments in Texas family law must be-
gin with the remarkable 1995 legislative session. According to
knowledgeable commentators, "the 74th Legislature saw more
change to the parent-child section of the Family Code than at any time
since the original enactment of Title 2 in 1973."' While a large part of
this legislative hubbub was little more than wholesale renumbering and
reorganization, 2 the Legislature also engaged in a fair amount of substan-
tive (and occasionally questionable 3) tinkering.
While some of the more notable specific changes are treated in the
appropriate subject-matter sections that follow, 4 a fair number are of
broader application. For example, in an attempt to guarantee some mini-
mum level of competent representation for children,5 ad litem rules have
* B.F.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., Harvard Uni-
versity. Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. Scott P. Callahan and
Anthony E. Duckworth, students at the South Texas College of Law, assisted greatly in the
preparation of this article.
1. John J. Sampson & Howard G. Baldwin, Jr., Family Law: Top 10 Things That
Happened This Legislative Session, 58 TEX. B.J. 950, 950 (1995).
2. Most notably, the Legislature created a new Title 5, containing statutes relating to
suits affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR).
For purposes of simplicity, all statutory references in this paper have been amended at
great cost and personal sacrifice to conform to the new numbering scheme, rather than the
old version reflected in the text of the opinions, unless some substantive change is
involved.
3. At least a couple of the legislative changes may face constitutional challenges. See
infra text accompanying notes 161-73 (prohibiting persons in default on support obliga-
tions from obtaining marriage licenses) and 176-78 (retroactively rendering support and
conservatorship agreements unenforceable as contracts).
4. A useful short summary also was published by the Family Law Section of the State
Bar. See 1995 Legislation Affecting Family Law Practice, 1995-3 STATE BAR SEC. REP.
FAM. L. 3-59.
5. Sampson and Baldwin comment, appropriately, that "[i]t is a sad commentary on
the practice of law when the legislature must intervene to mandate the most elementary
activities of an attorney." Sampson & Baldwin, supra note 1, at 951.
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been extensively rewritten.6 It is also worth noting, though of only tan-
gential interest to this survey, that the Texas Supreme Court issued two
ad litem decisions during this survey period.7 The statutes also have been
revised to accommodate binding arbitration8 and to assure that clients
know of the availability of alternative dispute resolution. 9 Finally, the
Legislature has made it clear that all professionals-even attorneys-are
legally obligated to report child abuse. 10
One case of potential general significance also bears watching. The
Texas Supreme Court has granted an application for writ of error in
Welsh v. Welsh," a case raising a jurisdictional challenge to Fort Bend
County's impact court. The impact court, staffed by a visiting judge and
taking cases "transferred" from other courts, was created to handle the
overflow from Fort Bend County's three district courts.' 2 The losing
party in a divorce and custody battle challenged the impact court's juris-
diction, arguing that the Family Code strictly regulates the transfer of a
case from one court to another.13
The appeals court reasoned that the impact court derived its power
from the Texas Constitution's provision authorizing district judges to hold
court for one another when they deem it expedient 14 and observed that
impact courts have routinely been held legitimate in criminal cases. 15
The court of appeals also reasoned that the case was not really trans-
ferred to another court since the caption on the pleadings continued to
read "328th District Court."'1 6 The court of appeals did not mention the
fact that the "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" and transfer statutes re-
lied upon by the appellant to demonstrate the impact court's lack of juris-
diction apply only after a "final order" is entered.' 7 In any event, the
case bears watching, particularly in light of the Texas Supreme Court's
6. Changes include the creation of ad litem "pools" in larger counties with continuing
legal education and competency requirements, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.006 (Vernon
Supp. 1996), and an outline of some of the ad litem's powers and duties. Id. § 107.014.
7. See Frank A. Smith Sales, Inc. v. Flores, 907 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tex. 1995) (per
curiam) (holding that ad litem fees cannot be awarded for representation after resolution
of the conflict that led to the appointment); Brownsville-Valley Regional Medical Ctr. v.
Gamez, 894 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Tex. 1995) (same).
8. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
9. This is accomplished by requiring that a specific statement acknowledging the
availability of alternative dispute resolution be included in a party's first pleading and that
the statement be signed by the party. Id. § 102.0085.
10. Id. § 261.101(c). The duty is non-delegable. Id. § 261.101(b). The attorney-client
privilege still exists, but is limited to the exclusion of testimony, not exemption from re-
porting. See id. § 261.202.
11. 905 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ granted).
12. See Patti Muck, Judge is Taken Off Impact Court Duties, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 8,
1994, at A-30.
13. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 155.001 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (acquiring continu-
ing, exclusive jurisdiction); id. §8 155.201-.202 (setting out requirements for mandatory and
discretionary transfer).
14. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11.
15. See generally Ex parte Holmes, 754 S.W.2d 676, 682 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)
(presenting historical summary of the use of impact courts).
16. Welsh, 905 S.W.2d at 617.
17. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 155.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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recent interest in sorting out family law jurisdictional problems.18 It is
worth noting (though in this world of Elizabeth Taylors, it is by no means
a record) that the impact court judge who tried the Welsh matter has
stepped down in preparation for his own seventh divorce. 19
I. STATUS
In In the Interest of J. W. T.,20 a highly controversial decision, the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that a person claiming to be the "real" father had
the constitutional right to bring an action, even if the child in question
had a presumed father,2 at least if that person makes "early and unquali-
fied acceptance of parental duties."' 22 The 1995 Legislature accommo-
dated the J. W. T. ruling by providing statutory authority for an action by a
supposed biological father23 and by setting out a two-year limitation pe-
riod for such actions.24 The Legislature also addressed some of the possi-
ble conflicting presumptions in paternity actions, emphasizing its
preference for scientific testing methods.25
In a refreshing switch from recent survey periods, the Texas Supreme
Court heard no major paternity cases. The closest the high court came
was State ex rel. Latty v. Owens,26 a procedure and sanctions dispute aris-
ing in a paternity context. The Texas Attorney General's office brought a
paternity suit against Owens at the request of its Louisiana counterpart.
After the blood testing mandated by statute,27 a family law master deter-
mined that Owens was the father and ordered him to pay child support.
The court initially signed an order adopting the master's finding, then
conducted a de novo trial on the paternity issue. When the state at-
tempted to introduce the blood test results into evidence, Owens objected
on the basis that Latty's interrogatory answers did not name the expert
who conducted the tests. The court continued the hearing to allow sup-
plementation of responses. When the hearing reconvened a little more
than a month later, however, the interrogatory answers were still defec-
tive: the author of the paternity report was listed incorrectly; the mother
did not list herself as a person with knowledge of relevant facts; and the
mother's interrogatory answers were verified by her attorney, not herself.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 90-109.
19. See Muck, supra note 12.
20. 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994).
21. The case was treated extensively in the 1994 survey. See James W. Paulsen, Family
Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REV. 1197, 1197-1205
(1994).
22. J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d at 198.
23. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.101(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
24. Id. § 160.110(f).
25. In the case of conflicting presumptions of paternity, "the presumption that is
founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls." Id. § 160.110(e).
The legislation also provides that the weightier considerations should be found to favor a
presumed father who is not excluded by a paternity test that would exclude 99% of the
male population. Id
26. 907 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
27. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.102 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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The trial court excluded the paternity test results, pleadings, exhibits, and
affidavits.
The court of appeals reversed on the ground that these "death penalty"
sanctions were excessive.2 8 Failure to name the mother did not work as a
surprise on Owens, because "it was clear to all parties that the mother in
a paternity suit is a person with knowledge of relevant facts."'29 The
court of appeals also believed that the paternity test was improperly ex-
cluded. The trial court had based its holding on three reasons: (1) hear-
say; (2) failure to verify interrogatory answers; and (3) failure to identify
the paternity expert. The Family Code, however, creates a specific hear-
say exception for paternity reports,30 and the expert in question was ap-
pointed by the court, not retained by the parties.31 Moreover, evidence
that otherwise would be excluded for failure to respond to discovery can
be admitted on a showing of good cause.32 The expert's name was on the
test results, and the same evidence had already been presented to the
master. This, to the court of appeals, constituted good cause. 33 Finally,
"death penalty" sanctions must be just,34 which at a minimum means that
the sanctions must have some direct relationship to the offensive con-
duct.35 In this case, to quote the court, "[t]he offensive conduct was com-
mitted by an attorney with the Texas Attorney General's office, while the
party suffering the punishment was an indigent child in Louisiana. 36
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, though without comment on the
court of appeals' reasoning on the sanctions issue. Rather, the Texas
Supreme Court held that the trial court's order approving the master's
findings, signed before the putative father exercised his right of de novo
review, 37 was a final and appealable judgment. The court of appeals had
viewed the order approving the master's findings as a nullity since the
court's authority to do so is conditioned on the parties' failure to file a
written notice of appeal. 38 The Texas Supreme Court agreed that
although the trial court "should have held a hearing on Owens' appeal
before signing an order adopting the master's report,"39 failure to do so
did not render the order void. Since Owens did not appeal the first order,
and the trial court had lost plenary jurisdiction by the time the second
28. State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 893 S.W.2d 728, 732-33 (Tex. App.-Texarkana), rev'd
per curiam, 907 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. 1995).
29. State ex rel. Latty, 893 S.W.2d at 731.
30. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.109(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996) (stating that "[a] verified
written report of a parentage testing expert is admissible at the trial as evidence of the
truth of the matters it contains").
31. See id. § 160.104(a) (requiring the court to appoint and determine the qualifica-
tions of a paternity testing expert).
32. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
33. State ex rel. Latty, 893 S.W.2d at 732.
34. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b).
35. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991).
36. State ex rel. Latty, 893 S.W.2d at 732.
37. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 54.012 (1988) (repealed 1995).
38. See id. § 54.011 (repealed 1995).
39. State ex rel. Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 485.
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order issued, the master's paternity ruling, mistakenly adopted by the
trial court, stood.
Like State ex rel. Latty, In the Interest of S.R.M.40 almost managed to
present an interesting post-O.J. issue on the use of blood test results. The
putative father complained of the admission of unverified blood test re-
suits. Unfortunately, the father raised only a "no evidence" challenge,
compounding the problem with an incomplete statement of facts pre-
pared from a tape recording.41 Since the mother could be heard on the
tape, clearly stating that appellant was the father, the record contained
"some evidence" of paternity, no matter how one looks at it.
Before leaving the subject of audio-recorded trials, it is worth noting
that the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed a default paternity de-
termination because the entire tape-recorded record was gone. 42 The
court noted its distress about the fact that the trial court, on a very tight
budget, had bought only three months' worth of tapes, then re-recorded
new trials over the oldest tapes. The San Antonio court admonished the
trial court that its legal duty to maintain records for three years "is not
diminished by use of an alternative form of recordation. Neither can it be
eviscerated by budget considerations. '43
Two cases issued during this survey period reiterated the limit of a par-
ent's liability for a child's torts when that liability is based solely on pa-
rental status. The more interesting of the two, Rodriguez v. Spencer,"
rose from the death of Paul Broussard in a Houston "gay-bashing" inci-
dent. Broussard's mother (Rodriguez) sued the mother of a seventeen-
year-old who was implicated in Broussard's death. The mother was
granted summary judgment on the ground that her son's actions were
unforeseeable.
Rodriguez first asked the court to acknowledge a duty to third parties
arising from the Family Code's statement that a parent has "the duty of
care, control, protection, and reasonable discipline of the child." 45 Rea-
soning from the Legislature's specific provision elsewhere in the Family
Code for parental liability to third parties for property damage,46 and
from the fact that the provision relied upon by Rodriguez is usually cited
in criminal actions against parents for harming their children, the court of
appeals held that the statute "does not establish a parent's duty to control
or discipline children for the benefit of third parties. '47
Alternatively, Rodriguez asked the court to extend a common law
duty. At present, the parent-child relationship alone is not enough to
40. 888 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
41. Absent a complete statement of facts, the missing material is presumed to support
the judgment. An incomplete record therefore is fatal to a "no evidence" challenge. See,
e.g., Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990).
42. Walker v. Stefanic, 898 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ).
43. Id.
44. 902 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
45. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.003(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
46. See id. §§ 41.001-.003.
47. Rodriguez, 902 S.W.2d at 41.
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render a parent liable for the child's torts;48 there must be some in-
dependent relationship 49 or negligence.50 Rodriguez suggested that the
court adopt the Restatement position that a parent is liable for failing to
exercise reasonable control of a child when that parent "knows or should
know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. '51
Although Rodriguez argued that the Restatement does not mention fore-
seeability the court declined to adopt the Restatement and observed fur-
ther (correctly, in this writer's opinion) that the phrase "should know"
implies foreseeability in any event.52 The Rodriguez reasoning was un-
derscored in Childers v. A.S.,53 a factually complex case, involving "sex
games" played by children and accusations of parental failure to control.
Making a long story short, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals endorsed the
Rodriguez analysis in detail and likewise refused to adopt the Restate-
ment position.54
In a followup to a high profile case of the last survey period,55 the child
of District Judge Raul Longoria and the child's mother were denied
standing to appeal the agreed settlement of a suit brought by the Attor-
ney General's office.56 The child, who was not a party to the suit, was
denied standing on the doctrine of "virtual representation" because his
interests were not identical with those of the state.5 7 The mother evi-
dently had no independent complaint.
Ex parte Wagner58 offers a minor twist on a long-settled constitutional
question. Wagner, adjudged the father in a paternity action, was held in
contempt for refusing to pay attorney's fees permitted by statute.5 9 The
father argued that incarceration for failing to pay these fees was unlawful
imprisonment for debt, in violation of the Texas Constitution.60 It has
long been held that imprisonment for failure to pay child support is not
48. See, e.g., Moody v. Clark, 266 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1954,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
49. This could, for example, include liability on traditional theories of respondeat su-
perior or joint enterprise. See, e.g., De Anda v. Blake, 562 SW.2d 497, 499 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
50. Moody, 266 S.W.2d at 912.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316(b) (1965).
52. Rodriguez, 902 S.W.2d at 43.
53. 909 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
54. Id. at 287.
55. In the Interest of B.I.V., 870 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1994). The case is discussed briefly in
the 1995 survey. See James W. Paulsen, Family Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REv. 1275, 1277-79 (1995).
56. B.I.V. v. Longoria, 897 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ
requested).
57. Id. at 398. The Corpus Christi court quoted a Dallas decision for the proposition
that "[tjhe child's interests ... in establishing the parent-child relationship with his father,
extend far beyond support, they include the right to a relationship with his father, the
avoidance of the social stigma imposed on those burdened by the status of illegitimacy, and
the right to inherit." Id (quoting Stroud v. Stroud, 733 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987, no writ)).
58. 905 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding).
59. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 106.002 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
60. TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 18.
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imprisonment "for debt," but rather for violation of a legal duty.61 The
reasoning extends to unpaid attorney's fees as incidental to the child sup-
port obligation.62 In Wagner the court of appeals simply took the reason-
ing one step further, reasoning that "a paternity action must be filed
before a mother can obtain, much less enforce, a child support obliga-
tion," and that a paternity action therefore "is by its very nature an en-
forcement proceeding." 63
Roberson v. Pickett64 was a case of first (and, one might hope, last)
impression on a strange question of service in a paternity case. The
mother of a child born out of wedlock was murdered. The maternal
grandmother filed suit on her own and the child's behalf and recovered a
judgment. She then filed an application for guardianship in probate
court. The child's biological father, who had been denied standing in the
personal injury suit, was notified and filed a contest of guardianship. He
then filed a separate suit in family court, without notifying the grand-
mother, established his paternity, and was awarded conservatorship of
the child.
In a bill of review proceeding, the question was whether the grand-
mother was entitled by statute to notice of the family court action. The
Family Code provides that citation "may" be served on "any ... person
who has or who may assert an interest in the child." 65 Under the facts,
this certainly included the grandmother. The mandatory portion of the
statute, however, requires service only on, inter alia, "a guardian" of the
person or estate of the child.66 At the time the family court suit was filed,
the grandmother had filed to be named guardian, but was not yet "the
guardian." Nonetheless, in this "unique situation" presenting a "case of
first impression," 67 the court of appeals held that the grandmother was a
person who was entitled to notice.
The court gave little credence to the father's argument that the ruling
would encourage potential litigants to rush out and file guardianship pro-
ceedings in order to be entitled to service of paternity actions. To the
court, "any concerns about an abuse of this process are trumped by an
interest in judicial comity. ' '68 The underlying problem, of course, was
that the father's attorney's action in failing to notify the grandmother of
the family court case was, at a minimum, "disingenuous" and smacked of
"deception. ' 69 To the court, the overarching "best interest of the child"
mandated some implied extension of the "guardian" portion of the
mandatory service statute: "Secretly filing suit involving some of the
61. See, e.g., Ex parte Birkhead, 95 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. 1936).
62. Ex parte Helms, 259 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. 1953).
63. Wagner, 905 S.W.2d at 803.
64. 900 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
65. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.009(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
66. Id. §§ 102.009(a)(5)-(6).
67. Roberson, 900 S.W.2d at 115.




same issues affecting a child serves neither the law nor the litigants. '70
In the "no great surprise" category, In the Interest of Sicko71 ranks very
high. Sicko, an unfortunately named 57-year-old man, sued to establish
paternity but the court held that the suit was barred by limitations. The
suit was so thoroughly barred by limitations that neither the current 72 nor
any former paternity-specific statute of limitations applied. 73 Suit there-
fore was barred by the residual four-year statute. 74 Even if a "discovery
rule" were applied to paternity actions-a question on which the court of
appeals court expressed grave doubts-Sicko had waited more than six
years after "discovering" his possible biological father to file suit. Sicko's
constitutional challenge was dismissed, in part, because he did not seek a
determination of parentage as a step toward securing some right of inher-
itance, or the like, but only to satisfy his curiosity. The court observed
that "appellant does not argue and we can find no support for a common
law right to bring a paternity action merely to determine the identity of
one's biological father. '75
II. CONSERVATORSHIP
Two major statutory changes in conservatorship law were effected by
the Texas Legislature at its most recent session. First, Texas now has a
statutory presumption that joint managing conservatorship is in the best
interest of the child. 76 While irresponsible media coverage led some Tex-
ans to assume that this change required Texas divorce courts to divide
possession time equally between the two parents,77 the statute did no
such thing. The requirement that the court determine the child's primary
physical residence remains in effect,78 as does the explicit statutory state-
ment that joint managing conservatorship does not require "equal or
nearly equal periods of physical possession. '79
The second statutory change may be more significant. Before the 1995
legislative session, a person seeking a change of sole managing conserva-
tor was required to meet a "well known, sometimes criticized" 80 three-
pronged test: (1) the circumstances of a party have materially and sub-
stantially changed; (2) retention of the current managing conservator
70. Id.
71. 900 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
72. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
73. As late as 1973, Texas did not recognize a cause of action for paternity. See JOHN
J. SAMPSON ET AL., SAMPSON & TINDALL'S TEXAS FAMILY CODE ANNOTATED 550 (1995).
Even under the current statute, Sicko's action would have been barred in 1961. Sicko, 900
S.W.2d at 865.
74. See TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986).
75. Sicko, 900 S.W.2d at 866 n.2.
76. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
77. Some of the mistakes in reporting are described by Sampson and Baldwin. Samp-
son & Baldwin, supra note 1, at 954 n.15.
78. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.136 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
79. Id. § 153.135.
80. John J. Sampson, Commentary to Chapter 14, Texas Family Code Symposium, 21
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1323, 1403 (1990).
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would be injurious to the child's welfare; and (3) appointment of a new
sole managing conservator would be a positive improvement for the
child.81 The second prong-retention of the current sole managing con-
servator would be injurious to the child's welfare-now has been
dropped.8 2 This change may not be of great importance, however, since
joint managing conservatorship is now a statutory option 83 and even a
possessory conservator now has many rights during periods of posses-
sion.84 Thus, since the "all or nothing" attitude that dominated the early
Family Code provisions has been modified in these very significant re-
spects, eliminating one prong of the old test is unlikely to have much
cumulative impact. 85
Other, less sweeping changes are worth a brief mention. Legislation
now specifically provides for possession of and access to an adult, dis-
abled child.8 6 New legislation also provides, as if it were necessary, that
conviction of child abuse is a "material and substantial change of circum-
stances" sufficient to justify modification of a conservatorship order.87
Conversely, parties who knowingly make a false report of child abuse in a
SAPCR proceeding may have that fact used against them in the determi-
nation of conservatorship.88 A court may order compensatory periods of
possession or access to a child when the party has wrongly been denied
prior court-ordered periods of possession or access.89
In Bigham v. Dempster,90 a divided Texas Supreme Court addressed a
question of dominant jurisdiction conflict in a child custody case. The
court was aided in its efforts by an all-star cast of counsel that included
four former justices or chief justices of the court, as well as two former
state senators, 91 a fact that was noted pointedly in the dissenting
opinion.92
The majority opinion begins its analysis with the optimistic statement
that "[t]he procedural facts are complicated, but the legal problem is sim-
ple." 93 Simplifying the facts somewhat, 94 the Bighams divorced in Harris
County. Mr. Bigham later obtained a temporary order permitting him to
81. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.101(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 153.005.
84. Id. §§ 153.073-.074.
85. See SAMPSON ET AL., supra note 73, § 156.101 cmt.
86. TEX. FAM. CODE ArN. § 154.309 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
87. Id. § 156.304(a).
88. Id. § 153.013.
89. Id. § 157.168.
90. 901 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1995).
91. Respondents, Judges Georgia Dempster and Bill Henderson of Houston, were
represented by former Chief Justice Joe R. Greenhill, and former Justices Oscar Mauzy,
C.L. Ray, and Eugene A. Cook, as well as several other appellate practitioners. See id. at
424, 425.
92. Id. at 434 n.1 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 425.
94. For example, while this case is summarized as involving two courts, there was a
further subplot involving a transfer from one district court to another in Harris County,
eliminated here in the interest of simplicity. See id. at 427-28.
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take the children to Fayette County. Four months later, he filed a motion
to transfer the suit, which included a motion to modify custody, to Fayette
County. Over Ms. Bigham's objections, the Harris County judge did so.
Mr. Bigham filed a certified copy of the transfer order with the Fayette
County District Clerk, who made an "official" notation that the case was
"docketed" on January 4, 1995. 95 In addition, on the same day, the Fay-
ette County district judge issued a temporary restraining order prohibit-
ing Ms. Bigham from removing the children from Fayette County.
Meanwhile, back in Harris County, a new judge assumed office on Janu-
ary 1, 1995. The case files still had not been packed and shipped. On
January 5, 1995, one day after the Fayette County "docketing," a new
Harris County judge set aside the transfer order. Further orders from
both courts followed in quick succession, as the "turf war" escalated.
In general, only one court has "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" over
children at any one time. 96 In the case of a transfer, the transferring court
"retains jurisdiction to render temporary orders," 97 but "jurisdiction of
the transferring court terminates on the docketing of the case in the
transferee court."'98 Ms. Bigham argued that the transferring court re-
scinded its order within its 30-day period of plenary jurisdiction, and that
the case could not be considered "docketed" in the new court until origi-
nals or certified copies of the records had been transmitted by the clerk of
the transferring court. In support of her contention, Ms. Bingham
pointed to statutory language providing that "[o]n receipt of the files...
from the transferring court, the clerk of the transferee court shall docket
the suit." 99
A majority of the Texas Supreme Court did not agree with this reason-
ing: "We cannot agree that the jurisdiction of the court turns on whether,
or with what diligence, a clerk performs a ministerial duty to forward
court documents." 100 The court found the purpose of the statutory provi-
sions to be to expedite transfers. The rapid forwarding of the transfer
order by counsel, and the equally rapid "docketing" of the case by the
clerk, in legal terminology' 0 sufficed to terminate the transferring court's
jurisdiction even though the case file remained in Harris County. 10 2
Thus, "[tihe rule is that the case is docketed when the court to which it is
transferred has received a certified copy of the transfer order and asserts
jurisdiction, or when all files have been transferred, whichever occurs
first."' 10 3 The court relied on the traditional legal meaning of "docketed"
95. Bingham, 901 S.W.2d at 426-27.
96. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 155.001 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
97. Id. § 155.005(a).
98. Id. § 155.005(b).
99. Id. § 155.207(c).
100. Bigham, 901 S.W.2d at 430.
101. Id.




in reaching this holding.104
In dissent, Justices Gonzalez, Spector and Owen stated that the deci-
sion "creates uncertainty in an area that demands certainty, and allows
venue shopping in child custody proceedings,"' 105 and that it permits "one
of the litigants, rather than the court clerk, [to] execute the order trans-
ferring venue."' 106 There surely is some force to the dissent's arguments.
In fact, it is not even certain from the court's decision what event trig-
gered the Fayette County court's jurisdiction: the court clerk "docketing"
the case, or the judge issuing a temporary restraining order on the same
day. If the latter triggered jurisdiction, which is one fair reading of the
opinion,107 then the court's opinion may have virtually erased the stat-
ute's "docketing" language. All in all, it is difficult not to sympathize
with the dissenters' concluding observation: "While many of life's re-
wards go to the swift, a race to the courthouse is not a sensible method of
establishing venue in child custody cases."' 08 Perhaps the best one can
hope from Bigham is that, due to its very unusual facts, it is "probably a
case that will never arise again."' 0 9
In Grigsby v. Coker, 1" 0 the Texas Supreme Court addressed another
highly unusual conservatorship-related issue. In a case characterized by
"intense acrimony,""' the father obtained a "gag order" prohibiting the
mother from referring to him as a pedophile or in otherwise derogatory
ways while the motion to modify custody was pending. The mother,
claiming that she was trying to secure evidence that the father had abused
other children in the neighborhood, distributed papers referring to the
husband as a child molester and to their child as a victim of sexual abuse.
She challenged the gag order as violative of her free speech rights.
The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus, refusing the husband's
invitation to carve out any exception to the general rules for family law
cases. 112 In general, a judicial gag order is warranted only when some
104. The court noted that "Itihe term 'docketed' in our jurisprudence has the connota-
tion not only of the clerk's formally placing the case on the list of cases pending in the
court, but also of notice that the court is ready to act on the matter, to take jurisdiction
over it." Id.
105. Bigham, 901 S.W.2d at 431 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 432 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
107. The dissenting opinion interprets the majority opinion as ruling that "the Fayette
County court had wrested jurisdiction from Harris County by entertaining a motion for
temporary orders," not simply by the clerk's action in docketing the case. Id. at 432 (em-
phasis added). The majority opinion discusses both the docketing and the court's action on
temporary orders, stating that transfer occurs when the transferee court first "asserts juris-
diction." Id. at 431. To this reader, at least, the language sounds more active than the
mere act of docketing a case. The statute, however, speaks simply of "docketing." See
supra text accompanying note 98.
108. Bigham, 901 S.W.2d at 434 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
109. David N. Gray, Comment, 1995-4 STATE BAR SEC. REP. FAM. L. 24.
110. 904 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1995).
111. Id. at 620.
112. The husband had argued for a broader authority to issue a gag order under the
Family Code's general power to issue temporary orders during the pendency of a SAPCR.
The court rejected this argument, stating that while the statute does grant trial courts broad
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immediate and irreparable harm to the judicial process would deprive the
litigants of a fair trial and, even then, only if the gag order is the least
restrictive means of preventing harm.113 The court stated that the gag
order issued in this case failed because it was overly broad.11 4 It prohib-
ited the parties from referring to each other "in a derogatory manner."" 5
The court noted, tongue firmly in cheek, that "[a]s the parties have little
to say about one another that is not derogatory, the order essentially pro-
hibits them from speaking about one another at all." 116 Grigsby does not
stand for the proposition that a gag order of this sort could never issue in
a family law case; it simply holds that the order must meet constitutional
drafting standards. 117
Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia" 8 deserves mention as an interesting
decision in a jurisdictional "turf war" between state and tribal courts
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). 119 Yvette Rita Johnson, a
full-blood member of the Yavapai-Apache Tribe, lives in Arizona. Her
three sons live in Houston. The father of the oldest child is unknown;
Monterey Clayton White, IV claimed to be the father of the two younger
children. In two suits (one of which originally was brought by the Harris
County Children's Protective Service), White's aunt and uncle sought to
be appointed as managing conservators of the children. The tribe was
properly notified of the suit 20 and intervened.
The decision hinged on the preliminary question of jurisdiction. Under
the ICWA, federally recognized Indian tribes' 21 have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of children on the reservation 22 and concurrent jurisdiction over
children domiciled off the reservation.1 23 In cases of concurrent jurisdic-
tion, as in the one before the Houston court, the presumption is in favor
of the tribal court. More specifically, the statute provides that "in the
absence of good cause to the contrary, [a state court] shall transfer such
proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either par-
ent," 24 provided that the tribe does not decline jurisdiction.
In one respect, the answer to the jurisdictional question was relatively
simple. White, claiming to be the biological father, objected to the trans-
fer. The ICWA's definition of "parent" excludes "the unwed father
statutory powers in family cases, "it does not authorize them to invade constitutional guar-
antees." Id. at 621.
113. Id. at 620 (citing Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. 1992)).
114. Id.
115. Grisby, 904 S.W.2d at 620-21.
116. Id. at 621.
117. See id. (noting that the court cannot "invade constitutional guaranties").
118. 906 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
119. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994). For a recent Texas treatment of the statute, see
Paul Shunatona & Tricia Tingle, Indian Child Welfare Act in Texas-An Overview, 58 TEX.
B.J. 352 (1995).
120. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1994).
121. See id. § 1903(8).





where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.' 1 25 After the
Tribe filed its motion to transfer, White filed a claim for voluntary pater-
nity126 and a statement of paternity as to the two younger boys.127 The
statement of paternity constitutes prima facie evidence of paternity and
liability for child support. 128 The Tribe argued that White's actions
should be ignored because the federal statute is worded in the past tense
and White's statement of paternity was executed after the Tribe's motion
to transfer was filed. This argument received short shrift, with the court
noting that a motion to transfer typically is "the opening volley in any
custody proceeding involving an Indian child"; 129 to ignore statements of
paternity filed after this date would be to discourage attempts by biologi-
cal fathers to take responsibility for their children, a result surely not in-
tended by the United States Congress. Alternatively, since White had
lived with the younger children since their birth and held himself out as
their biological father, there was a statutory presumption of paternity. 30
So far as the oldest child was concerned, the mother "implicitly" objected
to transfer by indicating that she did not want the case involving the old-
est child transferred if the case involving the two younger children was
not transferred. 31
Because an objection by either parent is enough to warrant a state
court in refusing to transfer jurisdiction to a tribal court, the Fourteenth
Court of Appeals could have rested its decision on that ground alone. It
did not. Instead, in a section of the opinion spanning some eleven pages
and nine footnotes,132 the court wrote an extended treatise on the history
and intent of the ICWA.' 33 The discussion highlighted the sorts of "good
cause" that would justify a state court refusing to transfer jurisdiction to a
tribal court,'34 and noted the difference between the "best interests" test
under Texas law and the ICWA.135
Boiled down just a bit, the sort of "good cause" that would warrant a
state court in declining to transfer a case to a tribal court is not defined by
statute. 36 According to non-binding Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines,
"good cause" could include, inter alia, the hardship that could result for
parties and witnesses forced to pursue the case in a tribal court. 137 Rec-
125. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (1994).
126. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.201 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
127. See id. § 160.202.
128. See id. § 160.203(a).
129. Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 173.
130. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.002(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
131. Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 175.
132. See id. at 161-71.
133. The opinion contains copious references to all the law review articles one could
possibly hope to ever read on the ICWA. On the other hand, the reader may prefer a short
and recent survey of the ICWA that comes free with the price of State Bar of Texas mem-
bership. See Shunatona & Tingle, supra note 119.
134. Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 163-71.
135. Id. at 168-71.
136. Id. at 163-64.
137. Id. at 164 (citing Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings,
44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,591 (1979).
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ognizing the difficulty that might be occasioned by moving the Houston
proceeding to Camp Verde, Arizona, the Tribal Court offered to come to
Houston to determine the matter.138 The Fourteenth Court of Appeals
rejected this option, citing the hoary case of Pennoyer v. Neffl39 for the
proposition that "[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted
by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established."'140 Since
the Tribal Court would have no jurisdiction outside the reservation's
boundaries, its well-meant offer was useless.
In dicta, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals also opined on the question
of whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to transfer the
case to the Tribal Court based on the "best interests" of the children. To
a Texas practitioner, the resolution of such an issue might seem a fore-
gone conclusion, considering that the best interests of the child are para-
mount in any custody determination, both by statute 141 and long-standing
court practice. 142 Nonetheless, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals stated
that it was improper to consider the children's best interests as dispositive
in a ICWA case. 143 In one respect, the court's reasoning is unexceptional:
as the court put it, "[q]uestions of 'best interest' are appropriate to issues
of placement, not jurisdiction."'"1
In another respect, however, the court viewed the "best interest" test
as a form of cultural bias, since "[w]hen state courts use this test, they
obviously consider the factors from their own perspective, that is, an An-
glo-American point of view.' 145 The ICWA was passed in part to combat
the racial and cultural prejudices that in past years had resulted in a dis-
proportionate number of Indian children being removed from their
homes.' 46 As the court put it, "Congress sought to ensure the continued
viability of Indian tribes by protecting Indian children from cultural
genocide."'1 47
The stated policy of the ICWA is "to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
138. This offer may, so far as the Houston-based author knows, establish some sort of a
record. The Fifth Circuit occasionally drops in from New Orleans to sit for a week or two,
and the Amarillo Court of Appeals has been known to come to town to help out Houston's
two state courts of appeals with their overloaded dockets. Even Amarillo, however, is not
so far away as Arizona is from Houston. See, e.g., STATE FARM ROAD ATLAs 3-4 (Rand
McNally 1994).
139. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The author, who teaches this case once a year to a group of
thoroughly bored Civil Procedure students, is grateful for the Fourteenth Court of Ap-
peal's attempt to give Pennoyer some current relevance.
140. Id. at 720.
141. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (stating that "[t]he best
interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining
the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child").
142. See, e.g., Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976) (setting out some of
the factors to be considered by a court in determining a child's best interests).
143. Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 169-70.
144. Id. at 169.
145. Id. at 168.
146. See id. at 161-62.
147. Id at 162 (citing Shunatona & Tingle, supra note 119, at 352).
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families.' 48 State courts are split as to whether the "best interest" of
Indian children is equivalent to the traditional state law "best interest"
test. Citing a dissenting opinion from an Oregon Supreme Court justice
with approval, 149 the court of appeals joined an apparent minority of ju-
risdictions150 in declining to consider the standard "best interest" test as
appropriate in transfer determinations. Instead, in the panel's view,
"[u]nder the ICWA, what is best for an Indian child is to maintain ties
with the Indian Tribe, culture, and family.' 151 To view the situation
otherwise, the court concluded, would be to "engage in the type of analy-
sis that created the need for the Act in the first place."'1 52 Justice
Edelman, it should be noted, concurred solely in the result. 153
Two custody-related contempt cases issued during the most recent Sur-
vey period, one from Houston and one from Amarillo, address a very
similar issue-whether passive conduct (or what was once, in military
parlance, the offence of "dumb insolence") can be a ground for contempt.
In Ex parte Morgan,154 the Amarillo court granted a writ of habeas
corpus when a mother was found in contempt because she "did nothing
to insist" that the children be ready to leave for a summer visitation with
their father. 155 While deciding the case on other grounds, the Amarillo
court opined that "passive conduct" of this nature was not punishable by
contempt. 56
In Ex parte Rosser,157 the Houston Court of Appeals dealt with a very
similar situation. The father was held in contempt for failing to deliver
his daughter for summer visitation with the mother. The daughter testi-
fied that the father "said that he would drag me into the car and I said
that I would go run away to a friend's if he forced me to go visit" the
mother.' 58 Citing recent Texas Supreme Court authority,159 the Houston
148. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994).
149. Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 169 (citing Quinn v. Walters, 881 P.2d 795,
810 (Ore. 1994) (Unis, J., dissenting)).
150. By the court's count, eight jurisdictions (Arizona, California, Indiana, Montana,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon and South Dakota) apparently follow the standard "best
interest" test; five jurisdictions (Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri and New Mexico)
decline to do so. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. This is one of several places in which the opinion's language might be consid-
ered by some to be poorly chosen, as it could lead to the conclusion that the panel believes
Judge Mejia was engaging in "cultural genocide," rather than just doing her best to apply
the appropriate law. See supra text accompanying note 147. It is not completely far-
fetched to believe that the best interest of a particular Indian child may entail factors other
than ensuring the long-term viability of the tribe. In fact, the stated congressional policy
seems to treat the "best interest" of the child and the "stability and security of Indian tribes
and families" as two different, though surely related, goals. See supra text accompanying
note 141.
153. Yavapai-Arapaho Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 175.
154. 886 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, orig. proceeding).
155. Id. at 831, 832.
156. Id. at 832.
157. 899 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding).
158. Id. at 384.
159. Ex parte -Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding).
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court defined the issue as one of "involuntary inability to comply," 160 that
is, that the contempt order was improper only if the relator established
conclusively that he could not comply. While granting the writ on other
grounds, the Houston court stated that the trial court was free to disbe-
lieve the evidence of father and daughter, as they were interested parties.
The split between Houston and Amarillo courts is quite clear. The
Houston court identified-three levels of contumacious conduct in visita-
tion matters: "(1) a parent actively discourages or impedes visitation; (2)
a parent passively fails to insist that a child comply with visitation; or (3) a
parent is legitimately unable to compel a child to comply with visita-
tion."' 161 To the Houston court, only the third category would qualify as a
defense to contempt.162 The Amarillo court, however, seems inclined to
accept the second, passive category of conduct as a defense to contempt,
as the Houston court noted with disapproval. 163 In this writer's opinion,
the Houston court probably has the better of the argument. Nonetheless,
it is difficult to argue with the Amarillo court's expression of frustration
at such counterproductive visitation games, leading to the admonition:
"It is imperative that both parents recognize that their personal feelings
must be submerged in carrying out their responsibility to obey the law
and, by doing so, demonstrate to their children that they should do so as
well."164
III. SUPPORT
During the most recent session, the Texas Legislature raised the stakes
for "deadbeat" parents. New Chapter 232, aptly summarized by one set
of commentators as "Pay Up, Bubba, or lose the hunting license and park
the pick-up,"' 165 provides for the suspension of a wide variety of licenses
on a showing that the obligor is more than ninety days behind in support
payments and has failed to follow a court-ordered repayment schedule. 166
The new legislation extends to licenses issued by more than fifty agencies,
including hunting and fishing permits, motor vehicle licenses and a vari-
ety of professional licenses 167 (yes, even those licenses issued by the State
Bar of Texas168).
The Texas Legislature, however, may have gone just a little bit too far
in its zeal to encourage parents to stay current on support payments
through the regulation of licenses. The new section 1.045 of the Family
Code requires that the persons applying for a marriage license submit a
sworn statement verifying that they are not delinquent in the payment of
160. Ex parte Rosser, 899 S.W.2d at 385.
161. Id. at 386.
162. Id.
163. Id. n.8 (noting that "we differ" with Amarillo "as to the second alternative").
164. Ex parte Morgan, 886 S.W.2d at 831.
165. Sampson & Baldwin, supra note 1, at 952.
166. TEX. FAM. CODE AN. § 232.003 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
167. Id. § 232.001.
168. Id. § 232.002(42).
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court-ordered child support.169 Failure to submit this affidavit disquali-
fies one from receiving a marriage license;170 a false statement in an affi-
davit constitutes a felony. 171
The Legislature's motives in enacting Section 1.045 seem obvious:
There may well be a state interest in preventing a person from starting a
new family when that person cannot support current children from the
old marriage. On the other hand, however, the new Texas statute is very
similar to a Wisconsin statute invalidated in 1978 by the United States
Supreme. Court in Zablocki v. Redhail.172 In Zablocki, the Supreme
Court noted that "the right to marry is of fundamental importance" and
that the statute "significantly interfere[d] with the exercise of that
right.' 73 The Supreme Court observed further that Wisconsin's interest
in keeping children off the public dole was not furthered by the statute:
The statute "merely prevent[ed] the applicant from getting married, with-
out delivering any money at all into the hands of the applicant's prior
children.' 74 Moreover, the statute would at best only stop deadbeat par-
ents from incurring additional support obligations. It was thus "grossly
underinclusive" in not "limit[ing] in any way new financial commitments
by the applicant other than those arising out of the marriage."' 75
The Texas statute, of course, does not stand on precisely the same foot-
ing as the Wisconsin statute invalidated in Zablocki. Perhaps most signif-
icant,176 Wisconsin is one of the majority of American jurisdictions that
do not recognize the doctrine of common law (or, in Texas, "informal")
marriages.' 77 Thus, while the United States Supreme Court in Zablocki
could state that applicants who could not meet the licensing requirement
"are absolutely prevented from getting married,"' 78 a person prohibited
from obtaining a marriage license under the new Texas statute would not
be so prevented: He or she could simply take up housekeeping and es-
tablish a valid informal marriage.' 79 This distinction does not, however,
necessarily favor the Texas statute, since it would weaken the rationality
of the relationship between the statute's language and its goal. More-
over, the Legislature's failure to treat formal and informal marriages
169. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.045 (Vernon 1993 & Supp. 1996).
170. Id. § 1.07(a)(1).
171. Id. § 1.045(d).
172. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
173. Id. at 383.
174. Id at 389.
175. Id. at 390.
176. Another distinction, probably less important than that discussed in the text, is that
the Wisconsin statute required proof that the child or children for whom support was not
paid were "not then and [were] not likely thereafter to become public charges." Id. at 402.
While the Texas statute has no such specific proof requirement, the state interest in enforc-
ing valid support obligations nonetheless seems significant.
177. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 765.16 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
178. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387.
179. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91 (Vernon 1993 & Supp. 1995).
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equally might well give rise to an equal protection' 80 or free exercise' 81
challenge.
In a curious but more clearly constitutional counterpoint to its restric-
tion on remarriage of deadbeat parents, the Texas Legislature specifically
prohibited a court from conditioning access to a child on the payment of
support. 182 Conversely, a court cannot condition the payment of support
on whether the managing conservator is cooperating with the possessory
conservator's attempts to exercise rights of possession or access to the
child.' 83
Another enactment of the 1995 Legislature also is worth mentioning
for its possible constitutional infirmities. Before the most recent session,
the question of whether agreements regarding custody or child support
incorporated into a judgment could be enforced as a contract or as a judg-
ment caused occasional problems. A 1995 amendment makes it clear that
the legislature intends such contracts to be enforceable only as judg-
ments, 184 and that this change in available remedies applies even to con-
tracts drafted before the amendment's effective date.' 85 This attempt to
"erase" contract remedies, however, is at least contrary to the spirit of the
United States Constitution's prohibition on the impairment of con-
tracts.1 86 The Legislature compounded this potential problem by failing
to make a corresponding change to the support statutes, 187 creating an
internal contradiction in the Family Code.188
Another, more minor, change includes a specific statutory provision for
180. A United States District Court in Texas, for example, recently invalidated a por-
tion of the pre-1995 Texas informal marriage statute on the ground that it unlawfully dis-
criminated between formal and informal marriage partners. See White v. State Farm Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 907 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that Section 1.91's former re-
quirement that a suit to prove the existence of an informal marriage must be brought
within one year of the time the relationship ended violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution).
181. A minister, rabbi or other religious official who conducts a marriage ceremony for
a couple who does not have a valid marriage license arguably commits a criminal violation.
See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.81-.83 (Vernon 1993 & Supp. 1995). Thus, a statute
that places an undue burden on an applicant for a license, but places no equivalent burden
on one who seeks to enter into an informal marriage, may be denying fundamental reli-
gious rights-the right to celebrate the sacrament of marriage-while not effectively fur-
thering any state purpose.
182. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001(b)(Vemon Supp. 1996).
183. Id. § 154.011.
184. Id. § 153.007(c).
185. Act of June 16, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 751, §§ 26, 129 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3888,
3933 (stating that the law "applies to a pending suit affecting the parent-child relationship
without regard to whether the suit was commenced before, on, or after the effective date of
this Act").
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .... "); accord SAMPSON & TiNDALL'S, supra note 73, § 153.007
cmt. (stating that "[tihe founding fathers took a dim view of retroactive impairment of
contracts").
187. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.124(c) (Vernon Supp. 1996) (stating that the
terms of an agreed support order "are not enforceable as contract terms unless provided by
the agreement").
188. Accord SAMPSON ET AL., supra note 73, § 154.124 cmt. (referring to the problem as
"an irreconcilable conflict").
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voluntary wage withholding for the payment of child support 189 as well as
the modification of such withholding to reflect the agreements of the
parties. 190
In Thompson v. Davis,191 the Texas Supreme Court corrected a trial
court's attempt to extend sanctions for support-related problems to the
question of conservatorship. The father had previously been judged in
contempt for failing to pay attorney's fees rising from the mother's suc-
cessful attempt to increase support payments. When the father later tried
to secure a modification of custody, the court prohibited him from con-
ducting any discovery regarding events occurring before the date he
purged himself of contempt. As a matter of general law, sanctions as-
sessed in litigation must be "just," that is, the sanction "must be directed
against the abuse and toward remedying the prejudice caused the inno-
cent party."' 92 Since the problem for which the husband had been sanc-
tioned arose in the context of the support dispute, the court reasoned,
"[i]t was excessive to extend this sanction to matters regarding custody,
which was not at issue in the prior proceeding.' '1 93
The Texas Supreme Court has dealt with at least two issues of con-
tempt procedure during the Survey period. One case, Ex parte McKen-
zie,194 deserves mention only as an example of the massive waste of time
(including Texas Supreme Court time) that can be occasioned by inatten-
tion to detail in drafting. Blake McKenzie had been sued for failure to
pay child support by his wife, his child's ad litem and the Attorney Gen-
eral's office. The Attorney General's office secured a contempt order
which wrongly named the ad litem as movant, despite the fact that the ad
litem's motions had previously been dismissed. The Texas Supreme
Court ordered McKenzie released on bond while considering his habeas
corpus petition, then dismissed the action as moot when the trial court
belatedly vacated its order.
Gerald Anderson was ordered to jail for child support arrearages on
the basis of a "fill in the blank" contempt order. He sought habeas
corpus relief from the El Paso Court of Appeals, 95 which granted the
writ on the ground that the commitment order did not adequately explain
how Anderson could purge himself of contempt.' 96 The court, however,
went to some lengths to emphasize that, since the defect was solely tech-
nical, "[t]he trial court need not... conduct another trial, hearing, or any
further proceedings whatsoever before entering a contempt order,"'1 97
provided that the order was sufficiently specific.
189. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 158.011 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
190. Id. § 158.403.
191. 901 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1995).
192. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991).
193. Thompson, 901 S.W.2d at 940.
194. 909 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1995).
195. Ex parte Anderson, 893 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1995, orig. proceeding).
196. The court found that the order did not properly specify the amount of arrearages
or the person to whom the arrearages should be paid. Id. at 196.
197. Id. at 197 n.4.
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In June 1994, in Ex parte Delcourt,198 the Texas Supreme Court had
ruled that a second contempt order, issued without an additional hearing,
violates due process rights' 99 if not issued "sufficiently close to the time
the judge pronounced the contempt. '200 Anderson petitioned the Texas
Supreme Court on this ground, pointing to a four-month delay between
the original and the second contempt order.201 The Texas Supreme Court
agreed and granted the writ, emphasizing the fact that the second con-
tempt order issued almost two months after the court of appeals
decision. 202
While a four-month delay between the two contempt orders may seem
like a long time, much of that time was taken up with the filing and deci-
sion on the original habeas action.203 To this observer, at least, there does
not seem to have been much slack time in the process. Nor did the Texas
Supreme Court offer any guidance as to how long a delay is reasonable.
As a practical matter, then, Anderson and Delcourt may make it neces-
sary to hold a new fact hearing after a contempt order is voided on even
the most technical grounds.
In Hammond v. Hammond,20 4 a panel of the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals split on a basic question of proof in a child support modification
proceeding. Jeff and Rhonda Hammond divorced in 1987, with an agreed
decree covering child support. In 1993, Jeff moved to modify. The trial
court granted his motion, reducing child support for his two minor chil-
dren from $400 per month to $202.58. Jeff presented evidence that he
suffered a herniated disk in 1992 which greatly reduced his ability to
work. Net resources at the time of the modification hearing were about
$800 per month, so the trial court reduced payments in accordance with
the child support guidelines. 205 Jeff did not, however, testify as to his
resources at the time of the 1987 divorce, other than to say that he had a
"high paying job. '206
Under the Family Code, modification of child support requires a show-
ing that the circumstances of the child or parent have "materially and
substantially changed since the date of the order's rendition. '20 7 The ma-
jority of the Fort Worth court applied the typical "double-snapshot" test,
that is, comparing the father's circumstances at the time of divorce with
the circumstances at the time of the modification hearing. Without credi-
ble evidence of the amount Hammond was making at the time of divorce,
his evidence of subsequent financial reverses could not "be placed in
198. 888 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1994).
199. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
200. Ex parte Delcourt, 888 S.W.2d at 812.
201. Ex parte Anderson, 900 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1995, orig. proceeding).
202. Id. at 335.
203. The original contempt order was entered November 10, 1994. Ex parte Anderson,
893 S.W.2d at 196. The court of appeals issued its opinion January 26, 1995. Id. at 195.
204. 898 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
205. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.124 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
206. Hammond, 898 S.W.2d at 408.
207. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.401(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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proper context. '20 8
In a dissent that runs about triple the length of the majority opinion,
Justice Lattimore criticized the court for adopting "a strict standard that
is unreasonable and contrary to common sense. '209 In his view, the statu-
tory requirement of a material change in circumstances "since the date"
of the earlier order 210 does not logically require proof of resources on the
date of the earlier order. Lattimore viewed the statute as preventing a
litigant from dredging up issues that existed before the earlier order, but
stated that the statute's language "provides the reader little guidance on
the quality, quantity, or character of evidence that is allowed or man-
dated to prove the requisite change in circumstances since that time. '211
In the absence of any direct statutory guidance, Justice Lattimore
turned to the Code Construction Act 212 for guidance. When a word is
not defined in a statute, that word should be "construed according to the
rules of grammar and common usage. '21 3 In addition, courts should as-
sume that the legislature intended a just and reasonable result.214 The
dictionary defines "since" as "after a time in the past,"215 and Jeff Ham-
mond did show a change in circumstances after the time of the order.
Moreover, in applying child support standards to Hammond's undisputed
income level, the majority's reasoning left Hammond committed to
spending more than half his net resources on child support, a result the
Legislature hardly could have intended, and one that "subjects [the] par-
ent to almost certain contempt proceedings. '216 Justice Lattimore con-
cluded by discussing several opinions from other courts of appeal which,
in his view, show signs of moving to "a more common sense approach
that considers all the circumstances underlying a trial court's decision to
modify." 217
Ultimately, the proof problem at issue in Hammond should not be dis-
positive in many cases. Careful presentation of evidence, combined with
an income tax return from the year of the divorce or most recent modifi-
cation, should avoid the evidentiary difficulty. Moreover, had the Ham-
mond divorce taken place after the Texas child support guidelines took
effect, and had the agreement been in accord with those guidelines,218 the
Hammond majority would have accepted a "reasoning backward" ap-
proach, deriving the obligor's net resources at the time of the divorce
208. Hammond, 898 S.W.2d at 408.
209. Id. at 410 (Lattimore, J., dissenting).
210. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.401(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
211. Hammond, 898 S.W.2d at 412 (Lattimore, J., dissenting).
212. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 311.001-.032 (Vernon 1988).
213. Id. § 311.011(a).
214. Id. § 311.021(3).
215. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2122 (1981) (cited in Ham-
mond, 898 S.W.2d at 412 n.5 (Lattimore, J., dissenting)).
216. Hammond, 898 S.W.2d at 412 n.5 (Lattimore, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 413.
218. An agreement is not required to be in accord with the child support guidelines.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.124 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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from the amount of the support payments ordered. 219 Nonetheless,
under the circumstances of Hammond, the court's approach seems to give
the trial court far less latitude in fact-finding than normal.
IV. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
The 1995 legislative session made no major changes in the law of termi-
nation and adoption. One amendment clarifies the fact that involuntary
termination of parental rights must be proved under the "clear and con-
vincing" evidentiary standard;220 another adds a new ground for termina-
tion when a parent whose children have been removed from the home
fails to demonstrate any continuing interest in the child.22' In the area of
adoption, the 1995 amendments strengthened public policy-the race of
prospective adoptive parents should not to be a factor in court proceed-
ings 2 22-by extending the policy to state agencies and licensed child-plac-
ing agencies. 223 A 1995 amendment also harmonizes state law with the
federally-required preference for in-tribe adoptions, 224 setting this out as
an exception to Texas policy.2 25
Most termination of parental rights issued during this Survey period
reflect the same dreary litany of neglect and abuse that trial courts face
on a daily basis, but offer little legal "meat" worth noting. In the "no
great surprise" category, first place goes to the Austin Court of Appeal's
ruling that the father's conviction for serious bodily injury to a child (read
that as "death"), even though the child was not his own, still was more
relevant than prejudicial in termination proceedings. 226 Second place
goes to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals for an opinion terminating the
parental rights of a man who admitted repeated sexual abuse of his eight-
year-old daughter,227 but who objected to any sexual offender treatment
that involved use of plethysmography.228 A strong honorable mention
goes to the Tyler Court of Appeals, which held that termination was justi-
fied 229 when officers checking on the welfare of children whose mother
had threatened to kill them in the past, and who had left the children in
the company of a convicted child sexual abuser, found the two-year-old
child "asleep on the floor lying face down in a bowl of spaghetti," super-
vised only by a four-year-old.2 30
219. Hammond, 898 S.W.2d at 408 n.1.
220. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001, 161.206(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
221. Id. § 161.001(1)(N).
222. Id. § 162.015(a).
223. Id. § 162.308.
224. See 25 U.S.C. 1915(a) (1994).
225. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.015(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
226. Trevino v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 893 S.W.2d 243, 251-52(Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
227. In the Interest of W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no
writ).
228. Id. The mother's rights were also terminated, in part because she observed at least
one act of sexual abuse, yet took no action to protect the child. Id. at 774-75.
229. In the Interest of J.F., 888 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1994, no writ).
230. Id. at 142.
1084 [Vol. 49
PARENT AND CHILD
The decisions are not completely without legal interest. The Tyler deci-
sion, for example, reiterates the position of other courts that, while termi-
nation proceedings do involve fundamental rights, criminal "effective
assistance of counsel" standards do not apply.231 The Fort Worth deci-
sion is worth noting for the court's commendable candor in publicly re-
treating from its own prior position-now in the minority of Texas
courts232-that the Family Code's provision for termination of rights on a
showing that "conditions or surroundings" endangered the child's well-
being233 referred only to physical living conditions. 234 In the future, the
Fort Worth court will join other courts in "look[ing] at the evidence re-
garding the physical environment as well as the environment produced by
the conduct of [the parents]. '235
Dupree v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services236
serves as a useful reminder of the fact that the sort of parental conduct
that could justify termination can occur even before birth. The child, a
"crack baby," was removed from parental care immediately on release
from the hospital, and parental rights were terminated shortly thereafter.
The mother admitted cocaine use through the pregnancy, including the
day she gave birth, and she was incarcerated for parole violation when
the termination trial took place. She had a prior stillborn child due to
syphilis, dropped out of a program of treatment for syphilis before her
second pregnancy, and did not secure regular prenatal care. The father
knew about these problems and did nothing. In addition, he used cocaine
himself, failed to attend parenting classes or pay child support, showed up
for only four of ten scheduled visitations with the child, and admitted that
the child would grow up in the company of drug users. The court recog-
nized that it could consider conduct both before and after the child's birth
and concluded that there was more than sufficient evidence to justify
termination.237
The most interesting termination case in this year's rather thin crop
may well have been In the Interest of R.D.S.,238 a decision from the
Amarillo Court of Appeals. A teenage mother executed an affidavit of
relinquishment of parental rights2 39 one day after birth;240 an unrelated
couple were named temporary conservators of the child, with a view to-
231. Id. at 143.
232. See, e.g., D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Serv., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1993, no writ); Smith v. Sims, 801 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1990, no writ).
233. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
234. See Stuart v. Tarrant County Child Welfare Unit, 677 S.W.2d 273,280 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
235. In the Interest of W.S., 899 S.W.2d at 776.
236. 907 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ).
237. Id. at 87; see, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 705 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
writ dism'd).
238. 902 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
239. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
240. A 1995 amendment to the statute provides that such affidavits can no longer be
secured until after a 48-hour post-birth "cooling off" period. See id. § 161.103(a)(1).
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ward adoption. The affidavit provided, as permitted by law, that the deci-
sion was revocable only for the first sixty days,241 though the mother
claimed she was told she had only three days to change her mind.
In any event, before the sixty-day period had passed, the mother in-
formed the conservators that she intended to block the proposed adop-
tion. She then initiated an on-again, off-again proceeding to recover the
child, but maintained very little contact with the child. When the matter
came to trial, the principal question was whether the mother's action in
signing the affidavit, even if later repudiated, was evidence that she "vol-
untarily left the child alone or in the possession of another not the parent
and expressed an intent not to return. 242 The Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals, relying on a 1966 Texas Supreme Court opinion,2 43 held in 1992
that it "could not possibly find that [a birth mother's] actions, which were
in accordance with her earlier decision to give [the child] up for adoption,
constitute evidence [to support termination] under the abandonment stat-
ute of the Family Code."'244
The Dallas court in R.D.S., however, disagreed. The 1966 decision, it
felt, dealt with different statutory language. The current Family Code
does not use the word "abandonment," with all its connotations of indif-
ference to the child's welfare; instead, it just describes a set of objective
facts. The court continued: "The legislature having so clearly spoken we
are chary, unlike the Swinney court [Fort Worth], to supplement the stat-
ute with elements judicially created and applicable to a repealed law." 245
Revocation of the relinquishment does not eliminate the fact that the affi-
davit was once signed. As the Dallas court put it, "the fact that the par-
ent had that intent is frozen, and rescinding the document simply evinces
a changed mind. ' 246 Accordingly, because the trial court felt that the
bulk of the evidence-including the affidavit-supported the statutory
ground for termination, the Dallas court affirmed. 247
Finally, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals also dealt with a procedural
question worth noting in In the Interest of Baby Girl T.248 An Indiana
mother signed a set of papers relinquishing parental rights, clearing the
road for a Texas adoption. An Indiana attorney and notary public ac-
knowledged the mother's signature. Some weeks after the termination
proceeding, in which the Gladney Center was named as managing conser-
vator, the Indiana woman filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the
attorney's acknowledgement was invalid because he had a financial inter-
241. See id. § 161.103(d).
242. Id. § 161.001(1)(A) (emphasis added).
243. See Hendricks v. Curry, 401 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. 1966).
244. Swinney v. Mosher, 830 S.W.2d 187, 192 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ
denied).
245. In the Interest of R.D.S., 902 S.W.2d at 720-21.
246. Id. at 721.
247. Id.
248. 904 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
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est in the suit.249 The Fort Worth court rejected the argument on eviden-
tiary grounds. 250 While the precise extent of the Indiana attorney's
involvement was difficult to judge on the record, he apparently did noth-
ing more beyond "acknowledging the documents supporting termination
and serving as the guardian of T.''251 Moreover, there was no evidence
that the attorney was retained to assist in the Texas adoption. No matter
what the Fort Worth court's holding, though, it surely remains good pol-
icy for an attorney to secure a notary public who is not an attorney in-
volved in the case, no matter how tangential that involvement may be.
249. See Terrell v. Chambers, 630 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Tex. App.-'lyler) (holding that
affidavit of relinquishment is invalid when acknowledged by an attorney with a strong fi-
nancial interest in the proceeding), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 639 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1982)
(expressing doubts as to the reasoning).
250. In the Interest of Baby Girl T., 904 S.W.2d at 208.
251. Id.
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